Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic definitions

Whilst computer-mediated communication (CMC) can benefit users by providing quick and easy communication between those separated by time and space, it can also provide varying degrees of anonymity that may encourage a sense of impunity and freedom from being held accountable for inappropriate online behaviour. As such, CMC is a fertile ground for studying impoliteness, whether it occurs in response to perceived threat (flaming), or as an end in its own right (trolling). Currently, first and secondorder definitions of terms such as im/politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987; Bousfield 2008; Culpeper 2008; Terkourafi 2008), in-civility (Lakoff 2005), rudeness (Beebe 1995, Kienpointner 1997, 2008), and etiquette (Coulmas 1992), are subject to much discussion and debate, yet the CMC phenomenon of trolling is not adequately captured by any of these terms. Following Bousfield (in press), Culpeper (2010) and others, this paper suggests that a definition of trolling should be informed first and foremost by user discussions. Taking examples from a 172-million-word, asynchronous CMC corpus, four interrelated conditions of aggression, deception, disruption, and success are discussed. Finally, a working definition of trolling is presented

Reconstructing Metaphorical Meaning

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La liberté ou la mort. Les arguments émotionnels dans les Philippiques de Cicéron

This article tries to show that certain trends in recent contributions to argumentation theory (as manifested especially in the work of Christian Plantin and Douglas Walton) are right in assuming that emotional arguments are not necessarily fallacious. Therefore, it is better to treat emotional arguments as relatively weak arguments, which nevertheless have some plausibility. The central goal of this contribution is a case study: The often very emotional argumentation in the Philippics of Cicero is reconstructed explicitly with the help of the underlying argument schemes, and it is evaluated afterwards with a set of critical questions. This analysis shows that it is necessary to judge the plausibility of emotional arguments within their verbal and historical context, according to well-established criteria. Moreover, it shows that Cicero sometimes manages to construct emotional arguments which are not only persuasive but also plausible. I have also tried to show that his emotional argumentation is fallacious in the majority of the specific cases